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What quickly became known as the " Arab Spring" is a series of 
protest movements, reforn1 movements, and revolutions (son1e 
bloody and some relatively "bloodless") that l1as been ongoing for 
more than two years in the n1ajority-Muslim world of the Middle 
East and North Africa. Arab Spring recalls both the European 
Re-volutions of 1848, dubbed the "Springtime of the Peop les," as 
well as the Prague Spring of 1968. And the events have drawn 
comparisons to the post-Soviet revolutions of 1989. The 
compilation of essays contained in this Special Issue of the Journal 
of lntenwtiounl Lmu reflects on these events from a variety of 
academic and pol icy perspectives, and grows out of the Journal's 
Novem.ber 2011 symposium entitled "Democracy in the Niiddle 
East." 
1. THE ARAB SPRING: DEFINED 
In December 2010, high unemployment, food-price inflation, 
political corruption, and suppression of freedom of speech and 
other civil and politica l  liberties precipitated n1ass unrest in 
Tunisia. Sparked, literally and tragically, by the self-immolation of 
I'v1ohammecl Bouazizi in a desperate plea for reform, the Tunisian 
Revolution, also known as the Jasmine Revolution or the Sidi Bouzi 
Revolt, in a mere twenty-eight days, achieved the resignation of 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after twenty-three years of 
heavy-handed rule. 
Oppressive regimes in Egypt, Libya; and Yemen were next to 
fall. Ben Ali's capitulation on January 14, 2011 was followed on 
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January 25 by Egyptians taking to the streets to protest the 
authoritarian rule of Hosni M ubarak, a rule embodied in  the 
interminable state of emergency law which supposedly justified 
police brutality and suppression of civil and political liberties. 
Much l ike his fellow head of state, Mubarak capitulated in the face 
of some three weeks of public unrest, resigning on February 11. 
In Libya, Colonel Qaddafi attempted to extinguish the 
revolutionary spark before its flames could engulf his four-decade 
rule by depicting his opponents as having al-Qaeda roots and ties .  
On February 15, in Benghazi, Qaddafi' s troops fired mercilessly on 
protestors, only fanning the flan1es Qaddafi had hoped to douse. 
During the civil war that followed, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution ,1973 (:tviarch 2011) to assist the Libyan rebels 
by enforcing a no-fly zone over the country. The conflict finally 
ended on October 20 when rebels seized Sirte, the town where 
Qaddafi had attempted to establish a new capital after Tripoli had 
fallen into rebel hands.  Qaddafi was killed in the process. 
In Yemen, protests against economic conditions, proposed 
constitutional reforms, and corruption that began on January 27 
Uust two days after those in Egypt) matured into a den1and for the 
resignation of beleaguered President Ali Abdullah Saleh and a 
series of protests and skinnishes between pro- and anti­
governn1ent groups. After Saleh reneged several times on signing 
a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-negotiated arrange1nent to cede 
power in exchange for in1munity, a failed assassination attempt on 
June 3 forced Saleh into exile in Saudi Arabia. Saleh returne d  to 
Yerrten on September 23, signed the CCC initiative on Noven1ber 
23, making way for elections, and formally ceded power to his 
elected successor on February 27, 2012. 
The Arab Spring is broader than these overthrows. In 
December 2010 and January 2011, shortly after the protests in 
Tunisia began, a sudden spike in staple food prices and a wave of 
self-irnmolations pron1pted mass protests in Algeria . On the san1e 
day that Ben Ali resigned in Tunisia, Jordanians took to the streets 
to protest unen1ployrrtent inflation, corruption, and to demand a 
real constitutional monarchy. The conflagration spread to Oman, 
with protests over depressed wages, unemployment, and 
government corruption beginning on January 17. Protests in Iraq 
over national security, corruption, and the country's poor 
economic conditions began on February 12, 2011, occurrin£ iust - LJ J 
after lv1ubarak' s resignation in Egypt and just before the conflict in 
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respect for hurnan rights and eventually demanding an end to the 
Bahraini monarchy, began on February 14. On February 19 in 
Kuwait .. protests against the statelessness and denial of citizenship 
rights of Kuwait's Bedoun population were part of a series of 
protests demonstrating growing dissatisfaction with the 
government. Protests in Morocco began the day after protests in 
Kuwait, orchestrated primarily by the 20 February Youth 
Movement. While King Mohammed appointed a cmnn1ission to 
amend the constitution to permit n1ultiple political parties, further 
concessions to constrain the crown and establish rule of law were 
not forthcoming as the king maintain authority over the judiciary 
and the security forces. 
1\!Iost notably, in Syria, protests that began on March 15 calling 
for an end to Ba' ath Party rule, by July 2011 had turned into a civil 
war that continues to rage \Vhile President Bashar al-Assad clings 
to power. The war has resulted in the deaths of sixty to seventy 
thousand, including thirty thousand civilians. More than one 
million Syrians have been displaced within the country, and 
another one million refugees have fled Syria, crossing into Turkey 
and Jordan. Nieanwhile, tens of thousands are reported to be 
imprisoned and suffering torture and other human rights abuses at 
the hands of the Syrian government. Government forces have 
repeatedly fired on unarmed protestors and civilians; while rebel 
group violations of international humanitarian law have also been 
reported .  Though the Syrian conflict at first overlapped with and 
drew comparisons with the conflict in Libya, to which the Security 
Council responded by authorizing the use of force; Russia and 
China have effectively vetoed efforts to authorize the use of force 
in Syria. The latest nevvs emerging from the conflict concerns the 
possible use of chemical vveapons by Assad, which might be 
enough to finally bring about a multilateral intervention to end this 
hun1anitarian crisis. 
As the Arab Spring has evol\'ed into the Arab sununer, fall, 
and >;vinter, it continues to warrant commentary and comparison. 
Vvhat caused the Arab Spring? \1\lhat is its scope? And �;vhat 
perpetuates it? Just as the moniker Prague Spring partly obscures 
what was in son1e \vays the domestic front of a transnational 
reaction to communist ideology, rhetoric .. and policy; so too does 
the moniker Arab Spring obscure. The Arab Spring is more than a 
protest n1ovement of ethnic Arabs or movements in Arab 
countries, and the moniker obscures the role that ethnic and 
religious minority groups have played m these social Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
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movements - Jews in Tunisia, Coptic Christians in Egypt Berbers 
in Libya and Morocco, Kurds in Iraq, Bedoun in Kuwait, Arabs in 
Iran, black Africans in Mauritania, and even Tuaregs in Mali . And, 
as Princeton University' s professor of Near Eastern Studies Mirjam 
Kunkler explained during the Journal Symposium, son1e even 
speculate that the very roots of the Arab Spring lie not in Tunisia or 
any one Arab country but in the failed "Persian Awakening" or 
"Green Revolution" of June 2009, protesting the tainted re-election 
of demagogue Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency, 
and then protesting the suppression of election protesters by the 
Ahmadinejad regime. 
And what of the Arab Spring's consequences? Will democracy 
take hold? Or will military tyrants simply be replaced by Islan1ist 
tyrants in some circumstances? Will "cells" of the Muslim 
Brotherhood allow the group to assert transnational influence that 
comes to dominate in the region? Will Gulf  countries a lign 
themselves to resist the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood? Will  
forging a unified policy to counter the Muslim Brotherhood bring 
the Gulf countries closer together and turn the Gulf Cooperation 
Council into a more forceful economic and security regime? Will 
Iran, in its support of regimes in Syria and elsewhere facing 
domestic social pressure to reform or resign, a lign itself  against 
Gulf countries and the Arab League? 
2. DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST : A SYMPOSIUTvl 
These are among the questions addressed during the Journal's 
November 2011 Symposium, organized in association with Penn 
Law's International Human Rights Advocates, and con1prised of 
two keynote lectures and three high-level panel discussions 
featuring experts in Is lamic law, l\1iddle East politics, 
democratization, international communications, and human rights .  
For example, the final panel discussion was entitled "The Post­
Revolutionary :Middle East: A Realistic Picture/' moderated by 
Penn political scientist and constitutional advisor to Kurdistan and 
Iraq, Brendan O'Leary. During the paneL Adnan Zulfiqar, Nabeel 
Khoury, and Lina Khatib discussed the role of Islamic law in post­
revolution politics .  Zulfiqar, an expert on Islamic law, is the Law 
& Public Policy Fel low at the Annenberg Center for Global 
Communication Studies, a doctoral candidate in Near Eastern 
Languages and Civilizations, and an alun1nus of Penn Law.  Dr. 
Khoury is a Minister Counselor in the U.S.  Foreign Service and 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/8
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formerly Director of the Near East South Asia Office of the U.S. 
State Department's Bureau of Intel l igence and Research. And Dr . 
Khatib is co-founder and n1anager of the Progran1 on Arab Reforn1 
and Democracy at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, 
Development, and the Rule of Law. 
Zulfiqar urged the audience not to take an ahistorical or non­
contextual approach to the events in the region. On the one hand: 
"It's difficult to dissociate religion fron1 the law when religion has 
a prominent p lace amongst the constituency." On the other hand: 
" [Avoiding] the tendency to consider the relationship between 
religion and politics as uniform across the Muslim world" is just as 
critical, because the role of Islan1ic law wil l  vary in each country, as 
many citizens view Islam as inherently oriented toward social 
justice, and have therefore come to associate Islam with democracy 
and as a counterbalance to authoritarian regimes . Thus, while in 
all likelihood "Islam wil l be central to the construction of these 
democracies because it is central to the lives of the people for 
whom these democracies are being constructed," Islamic law in the 
post-revolutionary Middle East wil l  be "subject to the court of 
popular opmwn." (Zulfiqar' s premonitions were proven 
warranted when, in June 2012, seven months after the Symposimn, 
Egyptians elected Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood luminary 
Niohammed Morsi to the presidency . Though Morsi attempted to 
assuage Egyptian fears of partisanship by resigning from his 
official positions with the Iviuslin1 Brotherhood and its political 
wing - the Freedom and Justice Party, the Isla mist trajectory is 
clear .) 
Dr. Khoury focused his con1mentary on what the Arab Spring 
portends for regional cooperation and international politics. 
Khourv observed that "the tradition has always been for 
J -
international actors to compete and regional actors to align." 
While the 1950s through 1970s witnessed contestation among Arab 
countries as to the ideal political systems and international 
alliances to adopt, Khoury recalled the deliberate efforts to 
minimize ideological differences in order to collaborate o n  
economic, political, and security issues i n  the wake of the Arab­
Israeli War of 1973. While the 1970s and beyond 'vvere defined by 
the decline of Soviet influence and the ascendance of Islam as a 
unifying force, the real meaning of the Arab Spring, from the U.S .  
foreign policy perspective, is that as "[t]raditional axes in the 
region are being reshaped[,] U .S. alliances in the region wil l  look 
different as well . . . . vVe 1nust strike a balance between assisting Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
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the transition and keeping good relations with Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries knowing our perspectives are diverging 
more and more and there will be tensions and problen1s." Like 
Zulfiqar, Khoury noted that Islamist parties were seizing power in 
the post-revolution moments. "These Islamist parties [ . . . ] have 
values and priorities that n1ay differ fron1 the pro-Western regin1es 
that preceded then1, but in the end they're willing to cornpron1ise 
and negotiate in the international arena." 
Dr. Khatib predicts that democracy will have exercised an 
overall "positive effect" on the countries that experienced some 
taint of the Arab Spring. //Even if the coming period sees a 
regression/ we can say the status quo and the region has definitely 
changed/ and there is no turning back." As Khatib intin1ates in the 
essay published here, entitled Political Participation and Democratic 
Transition in the Arab World,1 which expands on her Syrnposiun1 
presentation, change can be attributed, at least in part/ to the 
convergence of formal and informal spheres of political 
participation: such as the growth of Tunisian political parties after 
the revolution. Democratic ideals, hovvever, are insufficient for 
lasting democracy, she told the audience. Instead, //organization, 
leadership, program, strategy, coalitions, and resources" are the six 
essential factors that will make lasting democracy a true 
possibility. Because forn1al political space has becon1e 
progressively more accessible to citizens, and a gradual 
/'institutionalization of opposition/' is also foreseeable (in contrast 
with the prior tendency of authoritarian regimes to forbid and 
eliminate opposition parties), there is reason for hope. 
Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a Penn Law alun1nus who is On1ar 
and Azn1eralda Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the 
UCLA School of Law and holds the Chair in Islam and Citizenship 
at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, concluded the 
Symposium with an address entitled "Is Liberty God's Law? 
Slwri'n, the 1\!Iilitary and the Arab Revolutions." In his remarks, 
reproduced here as The Praetorian State in the Arab Spring/ Dr. 
Abou El Fadl called for increased scholarship concerning the 
sociological and political catalysts of revolutions in ''subaltern or 
I Lna Kl1atib, Politicnl Participation and Democmtic Tmnsltion in tlze A.mb �Vorld, 
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postcolonial" states. While Zulfiqar and Khoury discussed the role 
of the Islamic religion in post-revolution politics, and Khatib noted 
the growth of formal political parties and the inclusion of infon11al 
political networks in the policy-n1aking process, Abou El Fadl 
addressed a third variable - the n1ilitary. 
Turning to Egypt as a case study, Abou El Fadl discusses the 
"militarization of the state" as one of the key factors shaping the 
Middle Eastern revolutions. When the members of the army, who 
view themselves as indispensable to society, populate the ranks of 
governn1ent and the private sector, "[t]his [becomes] part of the 
reality that revolutions - whether in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria or 
Yemen - have to confront and deal with" for den1ocratization to be 
possible. As Abou El Fadl explains, the military ideology is only  
partly rooted in the Islamic culture shared by the rest of society . 
:tv1ilitary ideology is also rooted in the notion that the military 
should not only defend territory but should control political 
society. In spite of participants in the Egyptian revolution 
invoking such slogans as "the army and the people are one hand" 
in hopes of neutralizing the potential for military repression, the 
schism dividing the military and civilian consciousness is evinced 
in military attacks on praying citizens and bombardment of 
religious buildings. Thus, Abou El  Fadl asks, "VVhat does it mean 
to speak of a democratic revolution in a state vvhere the n1ilitary 
has become its own n1onstrous interest?" 
3. THE ARAB SPRING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, SECURITY? 
The conversation continues and expands beyond those 
addressed at the Syrnposium. In the essays included in this special 
issue, Lama Abu Odeh and Ann Elizabeth l\1ayer focus their 
comments on the cases of Egypt and Libya. Tn Of Lrrw and 
Rcuoluhon,3 Professor Abu Odeh argues that Egyptian factions 
engaged in contestation over the nation's future chose lavv a s  tl.1e 
fon!m for the conflict: constitutional amend.ments and 
declarations, parliamentary laws and legislati\'e anl.endrnents, 
military decrees, presidential decrees, emergency la \�</S rescinded 
and reissued, court trials, and constitutional court decisions. 
Meanwhile, even the judiciary has entered the fray with its 
statements in the rnedia. To Abu Odeh, the public rel iance on L:nv 
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and courts and the public criticism of the judiciary's actions (or 
inactions) represent the citizenry's revolutionary atte1npts to define 
the concept "rule of law." These attempts to define rule of law for 
Egypt, since the judiciary seems unable or unwilling to do so, are 
revolutionary because they contravene social hierarchical norms 
that would normally exclude the masses frmn such a project. 
Professor Mayer also examines the rule of law project, 
considering the potential for Libya after the revolution . In Building 
tlze New Libya: Lessons to Learn and Unlenrrz,4 although Mayer 
suggests that, in the aftern1ath of the Libyan Revolution, it is 
possible to observe the potential that l iving under the Qaddafi 
regime and "revulsion at Qaddafi's excesses insti l l[ed] a 
determination to ensure a future when criminal justice would 
adhere to international rules and when respect for human rights 
would be secured," she points out that there is much evidence to 
suggest that the contrary norm of brutality has been instil led  
among Libyans after four decades of Qaddafi' s repressive rule. For 
example, the Inanner in which Libyans- young rebels fighting in 
militias- captured Qaddafi, beat him, sumn1arily executed him, 
and then placed his festering corpse on display in a n1eat locker in 
Misrata, instead of handing Qaddafi over to the International 
Crin1inal Court which had issued an indictment and arrest vvarrant 
for Qaddafi in July 2011. Consider also the indefinite and 
incommunicado detention of Saif al-Qaddafi and the team of 
attorneys that the ICC sent to represent him. Meanwhile, rival 
armed militias, parroting the brutality of the Qaddafi regi1ne, face 
no restraint from any fonnal military (Qaddafi had enfeebled the 
mil itary during his rule in order to avert coup attempts), thus the 
terrorist attacks on international agencies, aid workers, and U.S. 
and British embassies and officials .  In short, Ivlayer remarks that 
the post-revolutionary environment in Libya is one of 
"lawlessness" in contrast to the dilemma that Abou El  Fadl 
observes in Egypt-the "Praetorian" or militarized state . On the 
other hand, Libya, like Egypt, is also witnessing the rise to 
prominence of Islamists and continued resistance to women's 
rights. 
1V1eanwhile, although the protest movements that typify the 
Arab Spring did not result in (or devolve into) civil war in most 
� Aru1 Elizabeth Mayer, Building the New Libya. Le::.sOI/5 to Learn a!ld Unleam, 
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cases, Amit Chhabra, Amos Guiora, and Jordan J. Paust 
nevertheless address the most pressing security issues that arise 
from the Arab Spring. Professor Chhabra takes our conversation 
from the domestic rule of law considerations to the question of 
what the Arab Spring portends for U.S. foreign policy in the 
region. In Autumnal Rage: Playing ·with Islmnic Fire,s Chhabra 
revisits the notion that the outcome of the Arab Spring might be 
Islamicization of Muslin1 society (as Zulfiqar and Khoury similarly 
had noted), and ponders the consequences of that ideological shift 
for use of force rules, counterterrorism cooperation, and human 
rights in the region and in l ight of customary international law on 
humanitarian interventions. Where Mayer hints at the anti-U.S. 
tenor of events subsequent to the revolutions as a symptom of 
lawlessness, Chhabra uses these developments - the death of 
Ambassador Stevens in the Benghazi attacks-as the focal point of 
his inquiry into the role that Islam will play in continued U.S. 
engagen1ent in the "Muslim world." 
Amos Guiora also picks up the security thread in Humanitarian 
Intervention and SmJereignty under tlze Umbrella of Geo-Politics/) 
describing the triangular relationship between these three factors 
as shifting after the Arab Spring, requiring foreign policy makers 
to consider vvhether their bureaucratic orientations and practices 
are sufficient to address the evolving dynamic among these 
concepts. While there are echoes here of (and explicit reference to) 
the ongoing discussion of the doctrine known as the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P or RtoP), Professor Guiora' s central point is how 
that "responsibility" will  be met given well-entrenched public 
policy positions, new leadership to engage, or new socio-political 
norms in �v1uslim countries. Guiora contrasts the geopolitical 
circumstances of Syria with Libya to challenge the conventional 
stories regarding the inactivity of the international community 
despite mounting death tolls in Syria and the tired rhetoric of 
If • !I never agam. 
If Guiora is in part addressing the use of force of foreign 
powers within a country facing a human rights or humanitarian 
crisis; in Use of Force in Sy rio by Turkey, NATO, nud. the United 
:; Amit Cbhabra, Autumnal Rage: Playing iUith Islauzic Fire, 34 U. PA. ]. };\JT'L L. 
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St·ntes/ Jordan Faust is addressing the legality of the use of force 
when internal turmoil threatens either international peace and 
security or the national security of a neighboring state . In both 
cases, there are international rules, including the U.N. Charter, that 
govern whether states and regional organizations m.ay use n1ilitary 
force on the territory of another state. But while Guiora' s question 
is, for example, whether human rights abuses n1ay justify 
intervention to spare Syrian civilians from the atrocities of the 
Assad regime, Professor Faust's question is whether there are legal 
justifications for the use of force in Syria. 
For example, do refugee flows and skirmishes that spil l  over 
Syria's borders into Turkey justify Turkey and others to use force 
to bring about an end to the Syrian conflict? Exmnining the 
constitutive charters of NATO, the Organization of American 
States, the African Organization for African Unity j African Union, 
and the League of Arab States, as well as the legal posturing of the 
OAS during the Cuban missile crisis and NATO during the war in 
Kosovo, Faust concludes that border skinnishes and other threats 
to international peace and security can give rise to armed conflict 
vvhich vvould justify Turkish use of force in self-defense. Faust's 
position, which captures one perspective among international 
lawyers, offers a view of the security concerns that arise out of the 
Arab Spring, where, at any moment, it seems, an internal conflict 
might morph into an internal nnned conflict which n1ight morph 
into an intenmtional arn1ed conflict. Given the presence of U.S. 
personnel in Jordan, counterterrorisn1 concerns of al Qaeda 
obtaining Syrian chemical and biological weapons, and U.S .  
recognition of the Syrian opposition, the use of force in Syria by the 
United States, Jordan, Turkey, or NATO could be in the future, and 
could be lawful. 
4. BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING? 
So many questions remain. \Vhither Israel? If anarchy prevails 
in son1e Arab Spring countries, wil l  the inability, for example, of 
Egyptians to control the Sinai, and of Jordanians and Syrians to 
exercise effective control of their territories, turn parts of these 
countries in to n1iniature Afghanis tans - new training grounds for 
terrorists, and justifying the use of force agair1st these states or 
7 Jordan J Paust, Use of Force in Syria by Turkey. NATO, nnd ti?c United Stotcs, 
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against the non-state actors residing in their territory? VVill Israel's 
attacks in Palestine against Ha1nas rejuvenate the Arab-Israeli 
conflict given Hamas' links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
and other countries? Will the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral 
success encourage the group to p lay the role of peace-maker 
between Israel and Hamas, as it did in December 2012? Or will 
Egypt's support of Fatah-Han1as reconciliation only antagonize 
Israel and further stall the Arab-Israeli peace process? 
Whither Africa? vVhile the Arab Spring began in and spread 
quickly to the majority-Arab and Muslim countries of North 
Africa- Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya; the contagion see1ningly 
spread east (to Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yen1en, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain: 
the UAE),  rather than south and west to black Africa. 1Nith some 
notable exceptions. 
Protests in rv1auritania began January 20, 2011 after the self­
immolation of Yacoub Ould Dahoud (modeled on the December 
\ 
2010 self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi that had sparked 
unrest in Tunisia), with com.plaints including black market slavery 
and racist census-taking. In Sudan, Al-Amin Moussa Al-Amin set 
himself on fire on January 23, 2011. Demonstrators invited their 
Sudanese compatriots to act in solidarity with the movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt, but the regime of infamous war criminal and 
genocidnire Omar Hassan Al-Bashir was generally able to suppress 
the smail protests . Bashir seems to have escaped the contagion of 
the Arab Spring with his regime intact. Protests in nearby Djibouti 
began on January 28, 2011. They were increasingly violent with 
the government of Ismail Omar Guelleh using batons and tear gas, 
mass arrests, the detention of protest leaders, torture, and shows of 
police force agair1st the stone-throwing demonstrators to stamp out 
the nascent mm:ement which fizzled and died by April of that 
year . 
In Mali, Taureg fighters, returning from the Libyan conflict, 
fueled an ethnic separatist conflict in the Azawad region, resulting 
in the March 2012 coup d'etat that ousted President Amadou 
Toumani Tmue, and the April 6 declaration o f  Azawad 
independence from Maii by the National Movement for Liberation 
of Azawad (lviNLA). In the months that followed, Islarn.ists 
factions prevailed in their the internecine conflict with the MNLA; 
the military intervention of France and the African Union on behalf 
of the Mali government in January 2013 resulted in the return of 
Azaw21d to Malinese control .  Have the Tuareg rebels and the Arab 
Spring unintentionally brought about the "return" of France to Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
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\Nest Africa, remm1scent of colonial-era control  over African 
politics and security and post-independence meddling by the 
former colonial power in African affairs? 
The conversations might just be beginning regarding the 
implications of the revolutionary moments in the Muslim World 
that began in January 2011 .  Conflict and instabil ity continues to 
typify l ife in Syria, Egypt, l\llali, and e lsewhere in the region.  How 
the Arab Spring will impact Israel, Iran, counterterrorisn1, U.S .  
foreign policy, and the development of international  hun1anitarian 
laiN - rules regarding the use of force, humanitarian intervention, 
and the responsibility to protect - remains to be seen . The Jo u rnnl 
of In tenw tionnl Lnw is proud to have chosen to address these topics 
in its 2011 annual symposium, and to present this Special Issue on 
the legacy of the Arab Spring. 
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